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JUSTICE STEVENS, RELIGIOUS ENTHUSIAST 
Andrew Koppelman 
ABSTRACT—It is sometimes alleged that Justice John Paul Stevens is 
hostile to religion. In fact, however, Justice Stevens espouses a position 
with religious roots and enthusiastically embraces a distinct conception of 
religion. This casts doubt on the claim, made in different ways by Eduardo 
Peñalver and Christopher Eisgruber, that the fundamental concern of Justice 
Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence is equality. At least as important to 
him is protecting religion from corruption by the state. 
To be consistent, Justice Stevens ought to acknowledge, more 
forthrightly than he does, that he treats religion as a distinctive human good. 
Any notion of corruption implies a norm or ideal state from which the 
corruption is a falling off. An invocation of the corruption rationale 
presupposes that religion is a good thing deserving of protection. To call 
this view hostile to religion is confused to the point of perversity. 
 
AUTHOR—John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political 
Science, Northwestern University. Thanks to Diane Amann and Thomas 
Berg for helpful comments, to Marcia Lehr for research assistance, and to 
Justice Stevens for laughing at the title. This is the first piece I’ve written 
closely reading Justice Stevens’s work, but I have also written a book that 
defends and elaborates upon one of his dissenting opinions.† 
 
†  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? HOW 
THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION (2009). 
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The often-repeated allegation that Justice John Paul Stevens is hostile 
to religion1 has been authoritatively debunked in a pair of fine essays by 
Eduardo Peñalver and Christopher Eisgruber.2 Here, I supplement their 
analyses in three ways. First, I will push their claims even further and show 
that Justice Stevens espouses a position that, in its own way, has religious 
roots and enthusiastically embraces a distinct conception of religion. 
Second, I will argue that Stevens’s religion-friendliness casts doubt on their 
conclusion that his fundamental concern is equality. At least as important to 
him is protecting religion from corruption by the state. Finally, I will argue 
that to be consistent, Justice Stevens ought to acknowledge, more 
forthrightly than he does, that he treats religion as a distinctive human good. 
I. HOSTILITY TO RELIGION? 
Begin by contrasting Stevens with his colleague, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, who worries about the hostility claim and so reveals its 
assumptions. In his first Establishment Clause opinion, conspicuously 
parting company with Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy claimed that strict 
separation of church and state “would require government in all its 
multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so 
to the detriment of the religious.”3 If this is right, then neutrality between 
Protestantism and Catholicism is detrimental to Protestantism, neutrality 
between Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism is detrimental to 
Presbyterianism, and so forth. Religion yearns for the state’s embrace and 
 
1  See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 245–48 
(2010) (collecting sources that assert this claim). 
2  See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal 
Membership, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2006); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Treating Religion as 
Speech: Justice Stevens’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2006). 
3  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe, dissenting from an opinion for the Court written by Justice Stevens, declared: 
“The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district’s student-message program is 
invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone 
of the Court’s opinion; it bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.” 530 U.S. 290, 318 
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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suffers detriment if it is denied.4 Justice Kennedy shifted to a less relaxed 
reading of the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman, but he was still 
careful to leave unresolved “questions of the definition and full scope of the 
principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State 
for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.”5 In a memo to 
Justice Harry Blackmun explaining his refusal to delete that language from 
his opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of showing that 
the Court “is not expressing any hostility to religion or religious persons.”6 
Justice Kennedy couples his vision of the harms of secularity with a 
deeply individualistic vision of the disestablishment of religion that the 
First Amendment commands. He thinks that the purpose of the ban on 
“establishment of religion” is to prevent coercion of individuals—
understood broadly, as evinced by his invalidation of a graduation prayer in 
Lee.7 Hence his recent majority opinion narrowly confining standing to 
challenge Establishment Clause violations in Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn.8 Unless individuals are demonstrably being 
hurt, Justice Kennedy seems to think that no violation of the Establishment 
Clause demands a judicial remedy.9 
Justice Kennedy’s vision of disestablishment is blind to a central 
purpose of the constitutional provision. That purpose also evades some of 
Justice Stevens’s most sympathetic interpreters. But it has not evaded 
Justice Stevens. 
 
4  Attorney General Edwin Meese III, in his influential 1985 manifesto for originalism, took a 
similar view. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727, 729–30 (2009). 
5  505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992). 
6  JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 150 (rev. ed. 2008) (quoting Justice Kennedy) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
7  The same point has been made about Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause, which, she thinks, “prohibits government from making adherence to a religion 
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s reading transforms the clause from a 
prescription about institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right, a right not to feel like an 
“outsider.” Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality 
and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 299–300 (1987) (citing Lynch, 465 at 688 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
8  131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 615–
18 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need for a “‘narrow exception’ 
to the rule against . . . standing”). Justice Stevens joined the dissent from the plurality opinion in Hein. 
Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (declaring that the parties had standing to assert a challenge under the 
Establishment Clause). 
9  There is a counterstrand within Justice Kennedy’s thinking, which emphasizes the danger that 
establishment will corrupt religion. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (“The First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or 
prescribed by the State.”). But the individualistic theme swamps this in Justice Kennedy’s overall 
conception and judicial practice. 
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II. “RELIGIOUS BELIEFS WORTHY OF RESPECT” 
A major impetus for strict separation between religion and the state 
was the religion-protective idea that religion can be corrupted by state 
support. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is 
determined to keep the state away from religion. It is associated with the 
most prominent early proponents of toleration and disestablishment, 
including John Milton, Roger Williams, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, 
Elisha Williams, Isaac Backus, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, John 
Leland, and James Madison.10 It is prominent, for example, in Justice Hugo 
Black’s 1962 declaration in Engel v. Vitale, that the Establishment Clause 
“stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our 
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”11 Black claims that there is 
something fundamentally impious about establishment: it breaches the 
“sacred” and the “holy.” It is remarkable to find such prophetic language in 
the U.S. Reports but it has appeared there repeatedly,12 often in opinions 
written by Justice Black, the principal architect of modern Establishment 
Clause theory.13 
Justice Black retired from the Court in 1971. Justice Stevens was not 
appointed until 1975. But the same themes can be seen in the opinions of 
Justice Stevens.14 In Wallace v. Jaffree, his first majority opinion in a 
 
10  For a survey, see Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1849–77 (2009). 
11  370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE 
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1783–
1787, at 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
12  See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that one 
“purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too 
close an attachment to the organs of government”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of 
sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer 
who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the 
government.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have 
staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and 
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”). 
13  See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1888–92 (discussing the scope of Justice Black’s involvement 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
14  And these themes are also evident in opinions that Justice Stevens joined. See, e.g., Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 643 (2007) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting with approval Justice Black’s statement in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947), that the framers thought “individual religious liberty could be 
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to 
assist any or all religions” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 
711–12 (2002) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the specific threat is to the 
primacy of the schools’ mission to educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered 
precepts of their faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871–72 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens 
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religion case, Justice Stevens declared that “the Court has identified the 
individual’s freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the 
various Clauses in the First Amendment.”15 He analogized state interference 
with religion to the unconstitutional compulsion of speech. He invoked the 
ideas of “individual freedom of mind” and “the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control.”16 Here is the analogy: 
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of 
mind, so also the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is the 
counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the 
majority.17 
Justice Stevens made a noteworthy move, one that distanced him from 
other separationists who rest their position on an abstract invocation of 
 
and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“[G]overnment aid corrupts religion.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
243 (1997) (Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) 
(“[R]eligions supported by governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of 
dissenters is burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Establishment Clause . . . was meant not only to protect individuals and their 
republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion 
from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 
(1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“The favored religion may be 
compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may be 
reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.”); id. at 615 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (quoting with approval Madison’s statement that “religion & 
Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together” (quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 105, 106 (P. 
Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Letter from James Madison]) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); id. at 627 (quoting the same passage and citing the importance of “protecting religion from 
the demeaning effects of any governmental embrace”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 
(1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a Christmas tree also works a distortion of the 
Jewish religious calendar. . . . [T]he city’s erection alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a 
relatively minor Jewish religious holiday . . . has the effect of promoting a Christianized version of 
Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects not only the State from being 
captured by the Church, but also protects the Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for 
its purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409–10 (1985) (“When the state becomes enmeshed 
with a given denomination in matters of religious significance . . . the freedom of even the adherents of 
the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.”); Sch. Dist. of Grand 
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (joining the majority) (warning that favored religions may be 
“taint[ed] . . .with a corrosive secularism”). 
15  472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985). 
16  Id. at 51–52 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 642 (1943))) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
17  Id. at 52. 
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“conscience.”18 (Or, to anticipate Part III of this Essay, the invocation of 
equality.) The right created by the First Amendment “to select any religious 
faith or none at all,” he wrote, “derives support not only from the interest in 
respecting the individual’s freedom of conscience, but also from the 
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free 
and voluntary choice by the faithful.”19 He even went so far as to quote 
expressly religious arguments made by Madison: “It is the duty of every 
man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to 
be acceptable to him.”20 
This language, with its emphasis on the inner light rather than the 
outward form, reflects that Justice Stevens is the last Protestant on the 
Supreme Court. Uncorrupted religion, for Justice Stevens as much as for 
Backus or Leland, consists in the liberty of the individual to seek God 
unimpeded by the state. Only beliefs generated by the exercise of that 
liberty are “worthy of respect.”21 This is not an uncontroversial religious 
view, although it is pervasive in American law.22 
Thus, although he was suspicious of some religious accommodations, 
he was part of the majority in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division, which found a constitutionally significant 
burden on religion when the denial of unemployment benefits put 
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs.”23 But Justice Stevens’s individualism is not Justice Kennedy’s: 
Justice Stevens understands that the protection of this individualistic 
understanding of religion requires structural limitations on the state. He has 
twice quoted with approval the following statement by Clarence Darrow: 
The realm of religion . . . is where knowledge leaves off, and where faith 
begins, and it never has needed the arm of the State for support, and wherever 
 
18  For examples of such separationists, see Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, 
and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 215 n.1, 232–33 (2009). 
19  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53. 
20  Id. at 53 n.38 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299–301 (Saul Kussiel Padover ed., 
1953)). 
21  Id. at 53. 
22  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan observes that the individualistic conception excludes quite a lot of 
religion: “[F]or most religious people everywhere at most times, religious leadership, and the form of 
government of one’s religious community, is, in some sense, given, not chosen, and related in explicit 
ways to government. Those are aspects of religion that gives it its authority and its comfort.” Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan, Requiem for the Establishment Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 310 (2008). 
23  450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). Justice Stevens joined Court majorities with similar reasoning in 
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989), and Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
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it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the religion that it would 
pretend to serve.24 
This theme appears in other Stevens opinions. His dissent in Roemer v. 
Board of Public Works emphasized “the pernicious tendency of a state 
subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission 
without wholly abandoning it.”25 In Wolman v. Walter, he was concerned 
that “sectarian schools will be under pressure to avoid textbooks which 
present a religious perspective on secular subjects, so as to obtain the free 
textbooks provided by the State.”26 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel 
Village School District v. Grumet, he declared that the state had 
impermissibly “provided official support to cement the attachment of young 
adherents to a particular faith.”27 The basis for his suspicion of judicially 
imposed free exercise exemptions, he explained, was his concern that it 
would place courts in “the business of evaluating the relative merits of 
differing religious claims.”28 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, he advocated “a strong presumption 
against the display of religious symbols on public property,”29 noting the 
“risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being 
advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement 
disrespectful.”30 He cited opponents of a state-funded crèche who “do not 
countenance its use as an aid to commercialization of Christ’s birthday.”31 
He quoted with approval Justice Black’s declaration in Engel that “[i]t is 
neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government 
in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning 
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people 
 
24  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Scopes v. State, 
289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25  426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
26  433 U.S. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
27  512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
28  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 & n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); 
see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 & n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the 
passage and repeating the point). 
29  492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 797, 806–07 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 718 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
31  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 811–12 & n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious 
guidance.”32 
Justice Stevens’s admiring view of religion is also apparent in his 
opinion for the Court in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of 
Stratton.33 He declared, while protecting door-to-door religious canvassing, 
that “[t]his form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under 
the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the 
pulpits.”34 Justice Stevens demands a high wall of separation because he 
wants to protect religion from the state. As he put it in Van Orden v. Perry, 
quoting Madison, “[R]eligion & [Government] will both exist in greater 
purity, the less they are mixed together.”35 
The same religion-protective impulse animates his advocacy of strict 
separation to prevent government funding of religious activities. From 
Justice Stevens’s earliest opinions to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, in which 
he denounced “the use of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of 
thousands of grammar school children in particular religious faiths,”36 he 
argued that state funding of religion would violate the Establishment 
Clause. Yet, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 
he joined the majority opinion’s holding that the use of public funds for a 
blind student studying for the ministry was permissible, because any aid 
“that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the 
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”37 Evidently 
the problem is not state funding as such. It is the potential of selective 
funding to distort religious decisions. The consistent theme is not the 
prevention of financial support for religion, but the protection of religion 
from manipulation by the state.38 
 
32  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 653 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
33  536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
34  Id. at 160–61 (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943)). 
35  545 U.S. 677, 725 n.25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Letter from James Madison, supra note 14); see also id. (“[T]here remains . . . a strong bias towards the 
old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition between [Government] & Religion neither can 
be duly supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a coalition, and such its corrupting influence on 
both the parties, that the danger cannot be too carefully guarded [against]” (second and third alterations 
in original) (quoting Letter from James Madison, supra note 14, at 105)); id. at 725 n.26 (“Religion 
flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of [government].” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Letter from James Madison, supra note 14) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
36  536 U.S. 639, 684–85 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37  474 U.S. 481, 487–88 (1986). 
38  Justice Stevens has one blind spot in this area. William Cavanaugh argues persuasively that the 
distinction between religion, understood as a distinctively unstable and dangerous set of beliefs, and 
patriotism, imagined as a stabilizing and valid reason to kill and die, is part of the legitimizing 
mythology of the modern state. See WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 192 
(2009). Under that ideology, the state itself becomes a sacralized object that elicits its own form of 
idolatry. This argument sheds unflattering light on Justice Stevens’s willingness to relax the protections 
106:567  (2012) Justice Stevens, Religious Enthusiast 
 575 
III. THE EQUALITY INTERPRETATION 
Peñalver has shown that the pattern of Justice Stevens’s religion clause 
decisions—siding with the liberals on Establishment Clause questions in 
invalidating public funding of religion and public religious expression while 
voting with the conservatives in rejecting free exercise-based exemption 
claims—is not motivated by hostility to religion. Rather, Peñalver claims 
that the decisions are animated by a distinctive perspective that holds that 
religious majorities are uniquely dangerous and religious minorities are 
uniquely vulnerable: 
Judicial intervention in defense of religion is . . . appropriate, on Justice 
Stevens’s view, principally in situations in which the Court thinks it likely that 
a religious group (or believer) is being unfairly singled out for unequal 
treatment or where some sub-category of religious groups (or believers) are 
particularly vulnerable to state coercion.39 
Special benefits for religion raise Justice Stevens’s suspicions when they 
benefit majorities, but such benefits for unusually vulnerable groups do not 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
Eisgruber similarly observes that Justice Stevens is most likely to 
intervene on behalf of free exercise claims when a religious minority has 
received unusually unfavorable treatment at the hands of the state, and from 
this infers that his central concern is equal membership in society.40 The 
central problem with establishment, according to Eisgruber, is that it 
signifies second-class citizenship for members of minority religions. He is 
more enthusiastic than Peñalver about this theme, but both are confident 
that it is Justice Stevens’s predominant concern in religion clause 
adjudication. 
Peñalver and Eisgruber are, I believe, correct in thinking that equality 
is one central concern of Justice Stevens.41 But neither of them recognizes 
the difficulties of putting this concern directly into practice. Both neglect 
the importance, to Justice Stevens and to Establishment Clause law more 
generally, of the corruption concern. 
It is true that the pattern of Justice Stevens’s decisions is one of 
protecting religious minorities. But is that the result he is aiming for, and 
 
of free speech in order to permit the state to criminalize the desecration of an American flag. See United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319–24 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 436–39 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
39  Peñalver, supra note 2, at 2247. 
40  Eisgruber, supra note 2, passim. 
41  Diane Marie Amann notes Justice Stevens’s early encounters with anti-Jewish prejudice. See 
Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
885, 916–17 (2010). When Justice Stevens took his first law firm job, he wrote to his old boss, Justice 
Wiley Rutledge, that the firm included several Jews, “[C]ontrary to the practice of most of the successful 
outfits in Chicago.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). He later cofounded a 
small firm that included a Jewish partner. Id. 
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should lower courts try to replicate this pattern? A major theme in Justice 
Stevens’s religion jurisprudence, from the beginning, is the need for simple, 
workable rules.42 Thomas Berg has shown that any attempt by courts to 
specifically protect religious minorities presents intractable difficulties: 
“Because of America’s complex patterns of religious identities, who is a 
minority will often vary depending on the geographical location, on the 
institutional setting in which a particular legal issue arises, and on how one 
chooses the key religious differences that sort groups into different 
categories.”43 The best way to protect minorities, Berg argues, is to “follow 
rules structurally designed to protect whoever happens to be the minority.”44 
This is, in fact, what Justice Stevens has been doing. 
The most thorough attempt to work out a theory of the religion clauses 
that directly operationalizes a concern with equality is the collaborative 
work of Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, who claim Justice Stevens as their 
champion on the Court.45 Like Justice Stevens, they think religion is 
valuable but argue that it is unfair to privilege it over other, equally valuable 
human activities.46 They do not always object to the legal singling out of 
religion. Rather, their central claim is that such singling out is only 
justifiable to protect religion from discrimination.47 Among their proof-texts 
is Justice Stevens’s declaration that “[a] paramount purpose of the 
Establishment Clause is to protect . . . a person from being made to feel like 
an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community,”48 
and his declaration that constitutionally mandatory exemptions “could be 
viewed as a protection against unequal treatment rather than a grant of 
favored treatment for the members of the religious sect.”49 
 
42  See ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION 44–47 (1988). 
43  Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 919, 923 
(2004). 
44  Id. A similar point can be made about religious division, which has also been a persistent concern 
of Justice Stevens. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1667 (2006). 
45  Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2180 (“Lawrence G. Sager and I have . . . shown how a Stevens-like 
equality-based exemptions jurisprudence could lead to more robust protection for religious conduct than 
the Court has ever provided.”). The theory is worked out at fullest length in their book, CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007), which 
elaborates on claims made in earlier articles, see id. at 264, 266 (discussing Justice Stevens with 
approval). Because some details of the argument are stated more fully in those articles, which aim at a 
more specialized readership, I will draw upon them as well as the book. 
46  See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 24. 
47  Id. at 9, 13. 
48  See Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2179 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 
515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
49  See id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)) 
(citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 147 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
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Instead of privilege, Eisgruber and Sager propose a principle that they 
call “equal liberty.”50 Equal liberty has three components: (1) “no members 
of our political community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual 
foundations of their important commitments and projects,”51 (2) “aside from 
this deep and important concern with discrimination, we have no 
constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving special benefits or as 
subject to special disabilities,”52 and (3) “citizens in general enjoy broad 
space within which to pursue and act upon their most valued commitments 
and projects, whether these be religious or not.”53 
Privileging and protecting, however, are not analytically distinct, but 
rather are logically continuous with one another. The question is not 
whether, but rather what, to privilege. Once this is understood, it becomes 
clear that, just like a minority protection principle, the equal liberty 
principle is empty and unhelpful in resolving any actual legal question. It is 
not a principle at all, but a worry about unfairness that can at best play a 
useful role in influencing judgment about inescapably discretionary 
decisions. 
Eisgruber and Sager reject claims “that religious convictions are more 
important or in some way more valuable than all others, that religious 
divisions are more dangerous than all others, or that religion is uniquely 
immune to political judgment and regulation.”54 But they are not Benthamite 
utilitarians who think that all preferences ought to be treated the same.55 
Some concerns have special urgency, religion is one of these, and it ought 
not to be privileged relative to the others: “religion does not exhaust the 
commitments and passions that move human beings in deep and valuable 
ways.”56 The authors offer several different formulations of the criteria for 
admission into this set of particularly important concerns: these are “deep” 
commitments;57 religion should not be privileged “by comparison to 
 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1289–90 (1994) (citing a similar point in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)). 
50  In earlier work, they referred to the same principle as “equal regard”: “Equal regard requires that 
the state treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard 
as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.” Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1285. 
In their book, they occasionally revert to the earlier term. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 13, 
89–93, 96, 102, 120, 256. 
51  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 52. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 245. 
54  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips Off Our Block? A Reply to Berg, 
Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2007). 
55  For a more fully developed discussion of the contrast between their views and Bentham’s, see 
Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571. 
56  Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1245 n.††. 
57  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 87, 89, 95, 101, 197, 241, 246, 252. 
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comparably serious secular commitments”;58 other concerns are equally 
“important”;59 “religious practices enjoy a dignity equal to other deep 
human convictions (such as the love parents feel for their children).”60 
Eisgruber and Sager deny “that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a 
category of human experience that demands special benefits and/or 
necessitates special restrictions.”61 However, they have their own special 
class. It just happens to be larger than “religion.” 
Once it is stipulated that some human wants have a stronger claim than 
others, the distinction between the two models, of privilege and protection, 
disappears. What Eisgruber and Sager really advocate is that deep 
commitments be privileged relative to shallow ones, but protected from 
discrimination relative to one another. 
To see how privilege and protection are intertwined, consider a 
familiar rule of law: all adults and no infants may vote in elections. Under 
this rule, adults A and B may vote, while infant C may not. A and B are thus 
privileged relative to C. If someone proposes to deny A the right to vote—
say, because A is black or female—this is discriminatory, and A is entitled 
to be protected from such a discriminatory rule. That rule would be wrong 
because it would impose an equality of the wrong sort: it would treat A as if 
she were (equal to) an infant. Guaranteeing the right to vote to both A and B 
protects each from discrimination relative to one another, but it also 
privileges both relative to C. 
Thus, Eisgruber and Sager are too confident when they say, for 
example, that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)62 is 
unconstitutional because it singles out religion and treats it as more valuable 
than some other human activities, or relieves religious people from burdens 
others must bear.63 
How can we know that the legislative regime of which RFRA is a part 
is giving unduly little weight to nonreligious concerns? RFRA alone cannot 
tell us that. We would have to know how those other concerns are in fact 
treated. 
Eisgruber and Sager respond that all discrimination claims face a 
similar evidentiary problem: one must always find a comparator to show 
 
58  Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 1271; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 90, 
101, 103, 108, 300 n.37 (“serious”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional 
Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 104 (“There is no 
coherent normative basis for insisting that religious commitments receive better treatment than other, 
comparably serious commitments . . . .”). 
59  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 6, 9, 15, 52, 95–96. 
60  Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 58, at 114. 
61  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 6. 
62  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
63  See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 264–67. 
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that discrimination is occurring.64 But the real question is whether there is 
an intelligible analytic distinction between privileging and protection in this 
context. The difficulty is not merely evidentiary. The problem is that, 
without further specification, we do not know what we are looking for 
evidence of. 
Professor Eisgruber declares that this vagueness is “deliberate, because 
I mean the proposition to be neutral among various ways of filling out the 
concept—though I do mean to insist that there exist some ‘comparably 
serious and fundamental’ non-religious commitments.”65 But in order for 
the principle to have any bite, it is necessary to specify what those 
commitments are. Unless that is done, one cannot possibly tell whether they 
are unfairly being treated less favorably than comparable religious 
commitments. 
Thomas Berg has shown that this is an intractable problem for 
Eisgruber and Sager: 
In any case involving accommodation of a religious interest, numerous other 
personal commitments and interests arguably are comparable, and the 
government typically accommodates some and not others.66 
Eisgruber and Sager argue, for example, that, where a police department 
allowed an officer to wear a beard for medical reasons, it also was 
appropriately required to allow a beard for religious reasons. But the same 
police department did not allow beards “to mark an ethnic identity or follow 
the model of an honored father.”67 So the requirement of equal regard is 
incoherent: “When some deeply-felt interests are accommodated and others 
are not, it is logically impossible to treat religion equally with all of them.”68 
A similar difficulty is presented by the Eisgruber- and Sager-like 
position that Justice Stevens took in City of Boerne v. Flores,69 in which he 
declared that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states 
because it violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Stevens’s position in 
this case is brief but dense and, I will argue, combines two different 
arguments. The first is like that of Eisgruber and Sager: other equally 
valuable commitments are being slighted in favor of religion. Justice 
Stevens wrote: 
 
64  Id. at 100–08 (responding to earlier criticisms of mine). 
65  E-mail from Christopher L. Eisgruber, Provost & Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Pub. 
Affairs, Princeton Univ., to author (July 10, 2005). 
66  Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1194 
(2007) (reviewing EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45). 
67  Id. at 1194–95 (commenting on Eisgruber and Sager’s discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
68  Id. at 1195. 
69  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an 
art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from 
the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because the 
landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its 
owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally 
applicable, neutral civil law.70 
Here the trouble is that some concerns that are just as valuable as 
religious ones are being discriminated against. But, as with Eisgruber and 
Sager, how can we tell whether RFRA is part of a regime of unfair 
privilege? Justice Stevens once cited the “overriding interest in keeping the 
government⎯whether it be the legislature or the courts⎯out of the 
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims” as a 
reason for denying religious accommodations: “The risk that governmental 
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring 
one religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was 
designed to preclude.”71 Perhaps he was suggesting in Boerne that RFRA 
presents precisely this danger of discrimination among religions. If it is 
never permissible to single out religion for special treatment, no specifically 
religious accommodation could ever be permitted. Yet this is not Justice 
Stevens’s view. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, he joined a unanimous Court in 
upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA)72 against an Establishment Clause challenge.73 In Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, he joined a unanimous 
Court in applying RFRA to limit the reach of federal law, without a whisper 
about the Establishment Clause.74 Perhaps he eventually was persuaded that 
facial neutrality does not preclude religious discrimination—for example, 
he did not defer to facial neutrality in the school funding cases.75 If it does 
not, then preventing religious discrimination may require religion-specific 
measures.76 So Justice Stevens has Establishment Clause worries, but they 
do not preclude every religious accommodation. Eisgruber and Sager, 
defending Justice Stevens, explain this pattern by saying that 
accommodation is permissible when it aims at preventing discrimination. 
Thus, “the Court’s analysis in O Centro was dominated by concerns that 
could easily be rephrased in the language of equality.”77 As we have seen, 
however, that standard is so malleable as to be meaningless. 
 
70  Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
71  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
72  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)). 
73  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
74  546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
75  I owe this point to Tom Berg. 
76  Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 799–802 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (making a similar point in a racial discrimination case). 
77  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 45, at 266. 
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The rest of Stevens’s Boerne concurrence raises a very different 
concern: 
Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute 
has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can 
obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is 
forbidden by the First Amendment.78 
Here the problem is not treating religion as a distinctive human good. It is 
that the state is again interfering with religion, by favoring theism over 
nontheism.79 In an earlier opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that “the 
Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it does for 
the adherent of a Christian faith.”80 There is a tension between this argument 
and the one about singling out religion, because the protection of religion 
from state interference itself singles out religion for special treatment. 
This concern could be addressed by understanding “religion” at such a 
high level of abstraction that it is not conflated with theism. That is, in fact, 
what the Court has done in other contexts.81 Justice Stevens never took up 
this possibility, but, I will argue in the next section, it is the approach most 
consistent with his general religion clause jurisprudence. 
The deepest difference between the Eisgruber–Sager approach and 
Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence is that the former focuses on civil status, 
and thus on harm to individuals, to the complete exclusion of any 
distinctive concern about protecting religion as such from state control. This 
can weaken the force of disestablishment. 
Consider Van Orden v. Perry, a Ten Commandments display case, in 
which Justice Stevens objected that the display impermissibly “places the 
State at the center of a serious sectarian dispute.”82 This is because “[t]here 
are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different 
religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a 
pious and learned observer, these differences may be of enormous religious 
significance.”83 Justice Scalia (joined, in this part of his opinion, by Justices 
 
78  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997). 
79  In Salazar v. Buono, Justice Stevens explained that “[a] government practice violates the 
Establishment Clause if it ‘either has the purpose or effect of “endorsing” religion.’” 130 S. Ct. 1803, 
1832 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)). 
80  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a symmetrical 
concern, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If school facilities 
may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to 
express a belief in God must also be permitted.”). 
81  See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also Andrew Koppelman, The Story of Welsh v. 
United States: Elliott Welsh’s Two Religious Tests, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 293 (Richard W. 
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (discussing Welsh and Seeger). 
82  545 U.S. at 718–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83  Id. at 717–18 (citing Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
471, 474–76 (1998)). Similarly, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, he would have invalidated 
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Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas) retorted, “The sectarian dispute 
regarding text, if serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious 
adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal 
consequences (I certainly was not).”84 
Justice Scalia envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which 
articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be eligible for state 
endorsement (and in which determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a 
source of law). Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition 
so long as that proposition is (or is believed by a judge unacquainted with 
doctrinal niceties to be) a matter of agreement between Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. 
Justice Stevens, of course, would have none of this. But if, as 
Eisgruber and Sager think, Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence is only about 
equal public status,85 then Justice Scalia is right and Justice Stevens should 
have been persuaded. Most citizens are not sufficiently well-schooled in 
theology to know or care that the state is adjudicating a religious question. 
If they don’t know about it, then it can’t adversely affect anyone’s public 
status. But evidently Justice Stevens cares about more than public status.86 
If Justice Stevens’s underlying concern is the protection of religion 
from corruption, then equality remains a pressing concern: discrimination 
among religious views is likely to produce a degraded form of public 
religion. But equality does not exhaust the concerns of disestablishment. 
The central concern is structural, having to do with the proper relations 
between the state and religion. It is neither about coercion of individuals nor 
second-class status for groups. 
 
a state law declaring that human life begins at conception, because he regarded this as “endorsement of a 
particular religious tenet.” 492 U.S. 490, 568 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
84  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 909 n.12 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). McCreary County was a companion case to Van Orden, decided 
the same day. 
85  See supra notes 40, 45 and accompanying text. 
86  Eisgruber emphasizes that Justice Stevens has quoted with approval Justice O’Connor’s 
declaration that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion 
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.” Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 2179 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); see also id. (quoting 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
But Justice Stevens in fact writes that this is what the Clause requires “at the very least.” Pinette, 
515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 
(1989)). This is no more his entire theory of the Clause than his declaration that the Clause, “if nothing 
else, prohibits government from ‘specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a 
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ.’” Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 
718 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
Justice Stevens repeats this sentence in Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1828 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). In both cases, he is accusing his colleagues of violating even their own cramped 
interpretations of the Clause. He is not embracing those interpretations. 
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IV. THE GOOD OF RELIGION? 
One of the impulses that drives Justice Scalia away from Justice 
Stevens is the suspicion that Justice Stevens’s views are incoherent: Justice 
Stevens opposes special treatment of religion, yet sometimes supports free 
exercise accommodations. “We have not yet come close to reconciling [the 
requirement that government not advance religion] and our Free Exercise 
cases,” Justice Scalia writes, “and typically we do not really try.”87 The 
solution Justice Scalia and others have proposed would impose dramatic 
limits upon the Establishment Clause. They would read the Clause only to 
prohibit favoritism among monotheistic sects, while permitting states to 
favor monotheistic religion over its rivals, religious and nonreligious.88 As 
we just saw in our discussion of the Ten Commandments case, Justice 
Kennedy, who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion in pertinent part, is tempted 
by this solution. 
Justice Scalia has a point. It is not logically possible for the 
government both to be neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give 
religion special protection. Some Justices and many commentators have 
therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension with itself. 
This apparent tension can be resolved in the following way. Begin with 
an axiom: the Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring 
religious truth. A number of considerations support this requirement that the 
government keep its hands off religious doctrine. One reason why it is so 
forbidden is that the state is incompetent to determine the nature of this 
truth. Another, a bitter lesson of the history that produced the Establishment 
Clause, is that the use of state power to resolve religious controversies is 
terribly divisive and does not really resolve anything. State involvement in 
religious matters has tended to oppress religious minorities. Finally, there is 
the consideration that, I have shown, is a major concern for Justice Stevens: 
the idea that establishment tends to corrupt religion. 
These considerations mandate a kind of neutrality. The state may not 
favor one religion over another.89 It also may not take a position on 
contested theological propositions. The scope of neutrality that the 
Establishment Clause demands has become broader as the range of 
contested theological positions has increased over time. Justice Stevens 
understands this. American society’s “enviable hallmark over the course of 
two centuries has been the continuing expansion of religious pluralism and 
tolerance.”90 The core principle, Justice Stevens has argued, is “the principle 
that government must remain neutral between valid systems of belief. As 
 
87  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88  See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1899–1901. 
89  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–24 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
90  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 730 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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religious pluralism has expanded, so has our acceptance of what constitutes 
valid belief systems.”91 
It is, however, possible, without declaring religious truth, for the state 
to favor religion at a very abstract level. The Court noticed this in Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock when it invalidated a law that granted a tax 
exemption to theistic publications but not atheistic or agnostic 
publications.92 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion, which Justice Stevens 
joined, said that a targeted exemption would be appropriate for publications 
that “sought to promote reflection and discussion about questions of 
ultimate value and the contours of a good or meaningful life.”93 Justice 
Blackmun thought it permissible for the state to favor human activity that is 
specially concerned with “such matters of conscience as life and death, 
good and evil, being and nonbeing, right and wrong.”94 What is 
impermissible is for the state to decide that one set of answers to these 
questions is the correct set. 
But the state can abstain from endorsing any specification of the best 
or truest religion while treating religion as such, understood very abstractly, 
as valuable. That is what the state in fact does. That is how it can 
accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously neutral. In 
Boerne, Justice Stevens construed RFRA to discriminate in favor of theism, 
but this was not the only way in which the statute could be read.95 The key 
to understanding the coherence of First Amendment religion doctrine is to 
grasp the specific, vaguely delimited level of abstraction at which “religion” 
is understood. 
CONCLUSION 
What in fact unites such disparate worldviews as Christianity, 
Buddhism, and Hinduism is a well-established and well-understood 
semantic practice of using the term “religion” to signify them and relevantly 
analogous beliefs and practices. Efforts to distill this practice into a 
definition have been unavailing.96 But the common understanding of how to 
use the word has turned out to be all that is needed. Courts almost never 
have any difficulty in determining whether something is a religion or not. 
 
91  Id. at 734. 
92  489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
93  Id. at 16 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). 
94  Id. at 27–28 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
95  Compare his reading of the statute in Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring), with the Court’s very broad and inclusive reading of the religious exemption from the 
military draft in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 
(1970). As noted above, Justice Stevens evidently did not read RFRA this way when he joined the 
unanimous Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
See supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
96  See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 1905–11. 
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The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of 
“religion” is a remarkably short one. The reference I rely on here, Words 
and Phrases, is one of the standard works of American legal research, a 
132-volume set collecting brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the 
present. Each case discusses the contested definition of a word whose 
meaning “determines rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities of the 
parties.”97 Some words have received an enormous amount of attention from 
the courts. Two examples, “Abandonment” and “Abuse of Discretion,” 
drawn at random from the first volume of this immense compilation, each 
exceed 100 pages.98 “Religion,” on the other hand, takes up less than five 
pages.99 The question of what “religion” means is theoretically intractable 
but, as a practical matter, barely relevant. We know it when we see it. And 
when we see it, we treat it as something good. 
Strong separationism is a strategy for protecting this good from 
corruption by the state. Any notion of corruption, however, implies a norm 
or ideal state from which the corruption is a falling off. An invocation of the 
corruption rationale presupposes that religion is a good thing deserving of 
protection. To call this view hostile to religion is confused to the point of 
perversity. 
Justice Stevens has never squarely embraced this answer to the 
dilemma. Before he could be expected to do so, it would have to be 
elaborated in considerably more detail than I can attempt here. But that is 
another story.100 
 
97  See Words and Phrases, in 10 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 448, 448–49 (Donna 
Batten ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
98  1 WORDS AND PHRASES 37–147, supp. 4–8 (West Publ’g 2007 & Supp. 2011) (Abandonment); 
id. at 323–462, supp. 23–66 (Abuse of Discretion). 
99  36C WEST PUBL’G, WORDS AND PHRASES 153–57, supp. 54–55 (West Publ’g 2002 & Supp. 
2011) (Religion). 
100  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (forthcoming 2013) 
(on file with author). 
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